Introduction
In 2008, Western economies were shaken by the burst of the housing bubble in the USA and since then Europe is caught in the Great Recession. Many European countries have been confronted with a longlasting economic recession with, in some countries, limited prospects of improvement for a foreseeable future (e.g., Kahler and Lake 2013; Schäfer and Streeck 2013) . Over the recent years, these countries also faced a financial crisis as a result of the need to rescue banks that are too big to fail and of the related public debts. European citizens, mostly but not only in the South of Europe, are confronted with rising unemployment, loss of purchasing power, and increased risks of poverty. In this context, the economy is on top of political agendas and figures among the most central concerns of citizens. Some political actors advocate the introduction of Keynesian measures in order to stimulate the economy and break from the dominant idea of austerity politics. Yet, altogether few alternatives to austerity and neo-liberal reforms are presented and discussed. It is important to note that, the longer the economic crisis lasts, the more likely it is to influence politics and to create the potential for a political crisis reinforcing trends of political cynicism among citizens who distrust political parties and either turn away from electoral participation or resort to protest voting.
Considering these trends, we study how the prolonged economic crisis contributes to the structuration of party politics or, in other words, how the crisis shaped the supply-side of politics. In so doing, we contribute to the debate about the paradigmatic transformations resulting from the Great Recession. More precisely, we analyse the effects of the euro crisis on the structure of party competition in the national electoral arena in three Eurozone member states, namely, Austria, France, and Germany. These three countries held national elections in 2012 or 2013-that is, in times of prolonged economic recession in many European countriesand after the bailouts of individual Eurozone members and the adoption of a comprehensive strategy to cope with the crisis by the European Council in late 2011. We ask whether and how the structure of party competition in the electoral arena in times of crisis differs from previous periods: Does the crisis trigger systematic and extensive change? Or does it rather reinforce trends that were already under way before the current crisis? It is important to note here that we are interested in the systemic level. In particular, we analyse changes in the key issues addressed in electoral campaigns, the dimensions structuring the political space and the configuration of parties within this space. The key issues are defined both in terms of the attention they gain-their salience-and in terms of conflict over these issues-polarisation.
We advance and explore two alternative scenarios. On the one hand, one may expect that in times of economic crisis the economy is at the core of the political campaigns-that all parties position themselves on economic questions during the campaign in order to attract voters whose main concerns are the state of the economy and the way out of the crisis. This follows from the idea that economic voting is accentuated in times of crisis and, thus, parties will position themselves on economic issues in order to gain votes (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000) . On the other hand, faced with such a crisis, political parties may have limited options or alternatives to offer in economic terms. Thus, they may try to steer the campaign away from economic issues on to issues on the cultural dimension, on which they have more leverage and can differentiate themselves more from each other. This follows from the idea previously introduced by Kriesi et al. (2006 Kriesi et al. ( , 2008 Kriesi et al. ( , 2012 that the cultural dimension of the political spectrum has gained in importance in structuring political conflict due to the rise of a new 'integration-demarcation' cleavage induced by globalization. According to this scenario, immigration and European integration (as the main issues dividing supporters and opponents of globalization) have become decisive for structuring political conflict. Furthermore, as political parties have limited capacity to change economic policies, and as parties converge to the centre on the left-right economic dimension (Kitschelt 2007) , they also tend to reinterpret economic conflicts in cultural terms.
In order to address the broad question of whether and how the party political space is restructured by the Great Recession, we use data on the parties' programmatic stances in election campaigns collected by Kriesi et al. (2012 Kriesi et al. ( , 2008 . We updated these data to include all elections that took place after the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008. So our data span the period from the 1970s to the latest electoral campaigns in the three countries in 2012 and 2013, respectively. 1 This allows us to put the most recent campaigns in a long-term perspective and to assess whether they reflect 'business as usual' or 'extraordinary change' along one of the two scenarios introduced before. While the economic prospects and party systems of the three countries differ, all three belong to the group of the so-called creditor countries in the Eurozone. The impact of the euro crisis on the national party systems has definitely been most impressive in the (southern European) debtor countries. This was exemplified most spectacularly in the Greek election in January 2015, which brought the radical left-wing party Syriza into power. With its focus on three creditor countries, our study provides a conservative test of the 'paradigm change hypothesis' introduced by Iglesias-Rodriguez -mations beyond the countries hardest hit by the current crisis, it seems not (yet) warranted to speak of changing paradigms in European party politics.
It is important to stress that political parties do not completely control the political agenda. Some key socio-political events or, in the crisis in particular, the media and the citizens' attention may turn towards specific issues parties did not plan to address. Thus, in the Irish elections of February 2011, dramatic events such as the bank guarantee or the withdrawal from the bond market attracted most media attention and were highly influential in shaping the citizens' opinion (Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012) . In other words, political parties may have to take a stance on events whether they are in line with their core program or not.
In what follows, we proceed in four steps, each addressing a specific research question. In the first step, we ask whether economic or cultural issues are most salient and polarised in times of crisis. More specifically, we compare the salience and polarisation on issues closely embedded in the two dimensions over the period from the 1970s until the latest elections. This allows us to assess to what extent one of the dimensions dominates the electoral campaigns in times of crisis and whether there is any departure from previous trends in this respect. In a second step, we turn to the questions of how much and what kind of change we observe. the cultural dimensions in order to see whether some specific issue gained prominence during the latest electoral campaigns. Then, in the third step, we examine the positions held on these issues and ask whether political parties jointly moved to the left or to the right of the political spectrum. Finally, bringing together all these constitutive aspects of political configurations, we inquire about the overall transformation of the political -petition in times of crisis? What does the actors' configuration look like? Do all these aspects differ from previous campaigns?
Taken together, our findings do not point to a systematic and strong change induced by the crisis in the three countries under scrutiny. The German campaign in 2013 has been rather depoliticised, and we observe no major changes from the pre-crisis period. In France, we find the reinforcement of long-term trends towards increasing polarisation on the cultural dimension, while Austria saw increasingly salient and polarised conflicts over both dimensions. But even in Austria, this has not led to any major restructuring of the political space. In all three countries, two dimensions continue to structure the political space in 2012-2013, and in all three countries we still observe tri-polar party configurations. Interestingly, however, the issue of European integration is no longer as firmly embedded in the cultural dimension, and it is not structuring the overall political space since most parties have converged on a more Eurocritical position.
Theoretical Expectations
During the Great Recession, the economic mood-the citizens' perception of how well the economy is doing in relation to unemployment, inflation, and growth-fluctuated across time and space. Anderson and 2014) identified three phases in this respect. In a first phase, from 2007 until 2009, the economic mood became rather pessimistic and remained at a negative level. In a second phase, during the whole year of 2009, it improved again. Eventually, between 2009 and 2011, differences appeared between countries-in some countries, like Germany, we observe a return to a more positive economic mood, while in other countries the mood remains more negative as in the case of France.
According to the economic voting literature, these negative perceptions of the economy should lead to economic voting, that is the incumbents are expected to be punished for the poor economic performances of their country (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000) . Although the incumbents may want to avoid campaigning on their bad economic performances, they may not be able to do so because these issues constitute a top priority for the electorate and because the opposition will seize the opportunity to campaign on the poor economic performance of the governing parties and these issues gain a high salience in the party-system agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Thus, we may expect to find a reinforcement of the economic dimen-electoral campaigns that took place in 2012-2013, after the economic mood and the economic situation of the countries diverged most. We may expect to find the strongest re-politicisation of the economy in the countries where we observe a persistence of the negative economic mood and economic indicators that signal a recession. In our case, France is the country confronted with the most pessimistic economic situation.
on the economic dimension.
Yet, following convergence argument, it is all but certain that parties will focus on economic issues under crisis conditions. According to this argument, political parties have moved to the centre on the economic left-right dimension and, although centre-right and centre-left parties may alternate in power, in terms of policies limited variations appear among mainstream parties (Kitschelt 2007) . Thus, we may expect that the mainstream political parties have little to offer in economic termsthey have increasingly lost control over the economy as they delegate power to the supranational agencies and offer limited differentiation in terms of the economic policies they defend (Mair 2006 (Mair , 2013 , This is mostly the case with regard to macro-economic policies, less so with regard to labour market and social policies. Thus, due to the crisis we may anticipate an increase in conflict on specific aspects of the economic dimension. Among the specific aspects on which political conflict may focus are the welfare state and potential targets of retrenchment or labour market policies since political parties have more leverage on these issues than on other macro-economic issues.
Alternatively, the focus of political campaigns may generally draw away from the economy as part of the parties' strategies. Political parties may try to shift attention away from the economy-where they have a limited margin of action and no alternatives to offer-and rather try to focus on issues on which they can better differentiate themselves from their adversaries. In this perspective, we would expect to see a reinforcement of the second dimension that structures the political space-the cultural dimension introduced by Kriesi et al. (2006 Kriesi et al. ( , 2008 . According to this line of argument, we would suggest that the crisis strengthened the new 'integration-demarcation' cleavage identified by these authors. This new cleavage is based on the opposition of 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization, that is, between those who see globalization in terms of new opportunities and enhanced life prospects, and those who feel threatened by the opening of borders in terms of social status, social protection, and life chances. In as much as parties tend to articulate this cleavage, they would seize the crisis as an opportunity to reinforce their stance on the cultural dimension. On the one hand, political parties may focus on European integration either defending or opposing transfer of authority and opening of the borders. On the other hand, parties may centre on immigration either supporting multiculturalism or defending national identities and boundaries. As indicated by Kriesi et al., changes in party structure since the 1990s are mainly due to the rise of the radical right in general and to the increased importance of conflicts over immigration in particular (see also Bornschier 2010; Ivarsflaten 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2005 ).
Design and Methods

Three Eurozone Member States
We focus on three Eurozone member states, which held elections after the height of the financial turmoil in Europe-Austria, France, and Germany. In 2010, the Eurozone countries, confronted with unsustainably high indebtedness of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, organized the bailouts of these countries in collaboration with the IMF. Moreover, the Eurozone countries agreed on the creation of the European Stability Mechanism as a permanent bailout fund and on a renewal of the Stability and Growth Pact (the Six-pack and the Fiscal Compact). The bailouts were accompanied by demands for austerity-reduction of public sector employment and social protection-and for neo-liberal reforms in the form of privatization and increased flexibility in the labour market. Thus, budgetary rigor was at the core of policy-making. Importantly, for us, the European measures adopted to comply with budgetary rigor and the required reforms in the economy were highly debated and adopted in the period prior to the elections we analyse in this chapter (Grande and Kriesi 2015) .
The three countries we analyse share similar situations in terms of their position in the EU in general (the three are part of the core of Europe without any major opt-outs) 2 and in the Eurozone more specifically (the -tance in the Eurozone crisis. Germany and France were at the forefront of the negotiations between debtor and creditor countries. In fact, Merkel and Sarkozy personified European austerity politics (Crespy and Schmidt 2014) . Austria is also a creditor country, yet it played a less central role during the crisis and the negotiations processes at the European level. Regarding the welfare state, all three countries correspond to continental welfare state models.
In economic terms, the three countries fared differently during the crisis. Austria is the typical example of a country that was little affected by the crisis, indeed Austria saw high growth rate and even increases in the employment rate in 2011. Similarly, the German economy fared well during the crisis after a first shock in 2009. Already in 2010 it started to recover. Germany experienced a slow growth in the beginning of 2013. Although internal consumption was stable, exports were slow due to the negative economic prospects in other European countries. Nonetheless, the election year 2013 was characterized by a moderate growth and a stable employment situation with a slight increase in employment. On the contrary, while also experiencing a return to growth in 2010 the French economy did not pursue its recovery in 2011. At the end of 2011, the economy sharply slowed down again. The exports suffered in particular during this period, which resulted in employment cuts as well as a raise in unemployment. Among the three countries studied here, France had the worst economic outlook at the time of the electoral campaign.
Turning to politics, the three countries differ in terms of the supplyside. In particular with regard to the presence or absence of a political party from the radical right: the radical right has successfully challenged the mainstream parties in France and Austria since the early 1990s (e.g., Betz 2004; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007), but-for historical, institutional and party-internal reasons-it has failed to establish itself at the national level in Germany (Dolezal 2008 campaign in 2013 saw the rise of a new challenger, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which can be regarded as 'functional equivalent' to the populist radical right in other European countries (Berbuir et al. 2014) .
Let us briefly present the main political parties in these three countries and the most important candidates in these campaigns. In France, we analyse the campaign leading to the first round of the presidential election in April 2012. This election opposed the incumbent Nicolas (PS). Both made it to the second round of the election with 27.2 % and 3.3 %. The 2012 presidential campaign in France appeared as a plebi-2012; Kuhn and Murray 2013) . In the first round of the campaign, Marine Le Pen (Front National), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Front de Gauche), François Bayrou (Mouvement Démocrate), and Eva Joly (Greens) were among the most visible contenders of the two main candidates. Marine Le Pen achieved the best ever result for the Front National with 17.9 % of the vote, whereas Mélenchon (11.1 %) and Bayrou (9.1 %) remained below expectations.
In Germany, we study the federal election of September 2013. In this electoral campaign, the main opponents were the incumbent Angela Merkel of the CDU and the Social Democrat Peer Steinbrück (SPD). The campaign has been characterized by candidate-centred campaigning on the side of the CDU, surfing on the good economic figures and the popularity of Merkel, whereas for the Social Democrats the campaign was hampered by the limited credibility and mobilizing capacity of Steinbrück, who was caught in a scandal over the high fees he received for his public appearances (Faas 2014: 240f.) . The other competitors were the liberals (FDP) (who had governed together with the Christian Democrats), the Greens, the radical left (die Linke) and the AfD. The election ended with a triumphant victory of the CDU (41.5 %). As the SPD also gained 2.7 % in vote shares (25.7 %), the 2013 elections mark a certain break with the trend of ever-declining vote shares for the two mainstream parties. All other parties represented in the national parliament lost votes. This was most dramatic in the case of the liberals, who, for the first time in post-war Germany, lost parliamentary representation as they fell short of the five % electoral threshold. With 4.8 % of the vote, the liberals obtained only little more votes than the newly established AfD (4.7 %).
In Austria, the parliamentary elections also took place in September 2013 and the two main candidates belonged to the prior coalition government: Werner Faymann from the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Michael Spindelegger from the Christian Democrats (ÖVP). Their competitors were the populist radical right Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Greens, as well as a new party, Team Stronach, which was founded one year before the elections by the Austrian-Canadian businessman Frank Stronach. The second populist right party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), faced difficulties with the death of its charismatic leader Jörg -ments and some members of its national parliamentary group left to join either the FPÖ or the Team Stronach (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014: 645) . Furthermore, the campaign saw the rise of a new liberal party, NEOS. In addition to economic topics, the electoral campaign was focused on some corruption scandals about illegal party financing and other offenses. Some of the cases dated back to the early 2000s and involved not only members of the current governing parties but also of the FPÖ and the BZÖ (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014: 644f.) . The two mainstream parties, the SPÖ (26.8 %) and ÖVP (24.0), had to face the worst electoral results since 1945. The FPÖ (20.5) and the Greens (12.4) gained respectively 2.5 and 2.0 % of votes, and also Team Stronach and the NEOS made it above the electoral threshold of 4 %. The BZÖ, by contrast, lost its parliamentary representation.
Data and Methods
In order to analyse political parties and their positions during the electoral campaigns, we rely on a relational content analysis of newspaper articles. Our content analysis rests on the analysis of two newspapers per From these papers, we selected all articles that were published within two months before the relevant national Election Day and reported on the electoral contest and national politics more generally. We then coded the selected articles by means of core sentence analysis (CSA) (for more details on the method and data, see Dolezal et al. 2012) .
Following this type of relational content analysis, each grammatical sentence of an article is reduced to its most basic 'core sentence(s)', which contain(s) only the subject, the object, and the direction of the relationship between the two. For this chapter, we are only interested in relations between political actors (subject) and issues (objects) (actor-issue sentences). The direction between actors and issues is quantified using a scale ranging from −1 to +1, with three intermediary positions.
The following analyses are based on a dataset of more than 24,000 actor-issue sentences from nineteen election campaigns in the three countries (one campaign from the 1970s and all campaigns in the period from 1988 to 2013).
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For the study of the 'crisis' elections, we can rely on 1040 actor-issue statements for France, 1160 for Germany, and 1756 for Austria. The actors were grouped according to their party affiliation. The issues were also coded in great detail (with more than 200 coded categories per election campaign). Following Kriesi et al. (2008: 58ff.) , we aggregated them into a set of twelve broader issue categories. Note that the twelve categories cover statements in favour and against the respective proposals. Table 9 .1 lists the categories and indicates what a positive statement towards a given issue stands for in our representation of the political spaces.
To assess our two scenarios, we are most interested in six of these categories for the purpose of this chapter. The first three issues-welfare, economic liberalism, and budget-refer to the traditional opposition between state and market. Conflicts over these three issues have usually struc-tured the economic dimension of the two-dimensional political space. By contrast the other three issues-cultural liberalism, Europe, and antiimmigration-are labelled as new cultural issues since they have emerged since the 1970s and have restructured the second, non-economic dimension. The rise of cultural liberalism in the 1970s predated the increasingly salient and polarised conflicts over immigration and Europe which have emerged since the 1990s. The remaining six categories are culture, army, security, environment, institutional reform, and infrastructure. According to the empirical findings of Kriesi et al. (2008 Kriesi et al. ( , 2012 , the first three issues are usually also integrated into the cultural dimension of the political space, whereas the last three issues are not consistently embedded in any of the two dimensions.
The components of party competition that we are interested here are operationalized as follows: salience is measured by the share of core sentences on a given issue category in percent of all coded sentences related to any political issue. The indicator for the polarisation of party positions 1971) index, which was originally designed to measure the degree of left-right polarisation in a party system. The polarisation of positions on a given issue category is computed as follow:
Where ω k is the salience of a particular issue category for party k, X k is the position of party k on this issue category, and X is the weighted average position of all parties, where weights are provided by the partyspecific salience of the issue category. Since actor positions are always measured on scales ranging from −1 to +1, the distance to the average (and our measure of polarisation) can range between 0 and 1. To measure the polarisation of a group of issues (in our case, economic vs. new cultural issues), we calculate the average of the polarisation of the individual issues, weighting them by the salience of the corresponding issue category.
Economic and New Cultural Issues: Trends Over Time
As a first step to determine whether the economy constitutes the core focus of electoral campaigns in the heat of the euro crisis or whether new cultural issues occupy a central place, we compare trends over time in terms of salience and polarisation (see Fig. 9 .1). The graphs present the evolution of salience and polarisation of the economic and the cultural dimensions from the 1970s until the 2012-2013 electoral campaigns.
As stated, economic issues include party statements related to the welfare state, economic liberalism, and budget, whereas new cultural issues include statements on cultural liberalism, European integration, and immigration.
First, Fig. 9 .1 highlights that in times of crisis both types of issues, economic and new cultural, are important. Jointly, they cover most of issue attention. Indeed, during the crisis electoral campaigns, in France and Germany, the economic and the new cultural issues capture each around 40 % of all discussed issues adding up to 80 %. In Austria, the share is distributed differently among the two dimensions with the economic one including 50 % of all discussed issues and the cultural including roughly -ronmental protection, security or institutional reform) include less than 30 %.
Turning to the trends over time, in the first part of Fig. 9 .1, we see that the trends in terms of the salience of both the economic and the new cultural dimension do not move systematically in all countries in the crisis. Some shifts in the salience of one or the other dimension appear, but most of these shifts were set in motion before the crisis. If the crisis had an effect, it rather seems to be reinforcing earlier developments. Most importantly, in France, the salience of the economic issues follows a continuous downward trend that is not halted by the economic crisis, whereas the new cultural issues have become ever more salient. In Germany, we observe a temporary increase in the salience of the economic dimension during the early 2000s, corresponding to the hard times of the German economy, when Germany was seen as the 'sick man of Europe' (see Dustmann et al. 2014 economic issues have become less salient again, while we observe a fairly strong increase in the new cultural issues. Only in the Austrian case, Fig.  9 .1 indicates that the economic dimension has been regaining salience in times of crisis, but we also note that this reversal has started already in the 2000s. The new cultural issues have also become more important in the Austrian context in the 1990s, but their salience has remained stable since then.
Second, regarding the polarisation of the two dimensions (see second part of Fig. 9 .1), we observe that the more salient dimension Fig. 9 .1 Salience and polarisation of economic and new cultural issues over time (1970s-2012/2013) tends to be the less polarising one across the three countries. This highlights the fact that a lot of the structuring capacity of new cultural issues is not due to their importance in terms of salience but rather because they divide the parties in terms of positions (Kriesi 2012: 119) . Before the onset of the current crisis, conflicts over economic issues were clearly less polarised than those over new cultural issues. Yet, the polarisation of economic issues increased in both Germany and Austria in 2013. In Austria, the cultural dimension also became more polarised since the early 2000s and increasingly so. As Fig. 9 .1 highlights, the Austrian campaign in 2013 is characterized by polarised struggles over both economic and new cultural issues. By contrast, in Germany we do not observe a similar trend. The new cultural dimension has become less polarising in Germany in 2013, a trend that already started in the 2000s. And this declining trend is only partly compensated by a corresponding increase in polarisation for economic issues. Overall, the German campaign in 2013 saw comparatively little polarisation. Finally, in France, we observe no pronounced trends apart from a certain decrease in the average political parties are still far more divided on new cultural issues than on economic ones.
What can we conclude from these first figures for the question that interests us here? It seems that we are confronted with politics as usual (with country-specific variations of what can be considered as usual) or, at least, that the crisis did not trigger any consistent and fundamental shifts in the salience or in the polarisation of issue competition in the three countries we analyse here. Taken together, we see no increase in either the salience or the polarisation of economic issues that seems to be initiated by the crisis and neither do we find a shift of attention towards new cultural issues or increasingly polarised struggles over these issues. In the next step, we disentangle the two sets of issues into more specific issues as this may reveal changes in terms of salience or polarisation hidden behind the aggregate measures presented so far.
The Rise and Fall of Conflict Over Specific Economic and New Cultural Issues
In this step, we ask what the visible and polarised issues are in times of crisis. In addition to the two indicators used up to this point, we form a summary measure by multiplying the two indicators for salience and polarisation which captures the degree of politicisation of an issue. This measure indicates the structuring capacity of a given issue because it only takes high values if both elements are given, that is, emphasis is put on the issue and parties take diverging positions. Apart from the level of salience and polarisation by issue in 2012-2013, Table 9 .2 also shows the issue-specific changes with respect to salience and polarisation from the pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . To put these results into perspective, we have also calculated a benchmark by comparing issue-specific levels and changes in salience, polarisation, and politicisation to the averages over the whole time period (all values above the benchmark are highlighted in bold). This benchmark allows us to see (a) which issues are particularly salient and polarised and (b) whether the changes observed during the latest electoral campaigns are exceptional.
The findings in Table 9 .2 confirm the general patterns found before, as the issues that became salient and polarised in the electoral campaigns held during the crisis show remarkable cross-national differences. Our measure of politicisation which captures the joint tendencies in salience and polarisation brings to the fore these diverging trends. In Germany, only conflicts over economic liberalism were highly politicised in the crisis election, whereas, in France, one economic (welfare) and two new cultural issues (cultural liberalism, and immigration) crossed our benchmark in the latest campaign. The highly conflictual nature of the 2013 Austrian campaign is illustrated by the fact that we observe values above our benchmark for no less than four of the six issues: welfare, economic liberalism, cultural liberalism and immigration. In other words, while Austria-and to a certain degree, France-saw highly politicised conflicts over new cultural issues in the last elections in times of crisis, this was not the case for Germany. We will discuss in detail, the salience and polarisa-tion across the three countries and return to the comparison of the three at the end of this section.
In France, the campaign mostly focused on the controversial figure of Sarkozy and appeared as a plebiscite against his way of doing poli-2012; Kuhn and Murray 2013) . In addition to the antitook issue with the increase of the retirement age and the cuts in public sector jobs adopted by Sarkozy and proposed to overturn them. Second, higher taxes for top incomes a proposition that also became a central theme in this presidential campaign. This is reflected in the relatively high salience of welfare and economic liberalism in Table 9 .2. Yet, for economic liberalism we observe a lower degree of polarisation and thus the multiplication of salience and polarisation does not result in an exceptionally high level of politicisation, while both welfare and cultural liberalism were much politicised in the 2012 French campaign. In addition to cultural liberalism, Europe and immigration also -moted at the European level by Sarkozy and Merkel (Merle and Patterson 2014) . Nonetheless, Europe was not a polarised issue as is indicated by the fact that Europe had the lowest degree of polarisation observed in the French case. This is due to the fact that all parties-including the governKerscher 2014). This contrasts with immigration which was as salient as Europe but involved far more opposing issue positions. It is important to note here that a specific event partly drove the attention towards immigration. In March 2012, the affaire Merah (shootings in front of a Jewish school) opened a window of opportunity for debates over immigration and for the campaign themes of the Front National.
In Germany, the issues that are salient and those that are polarised are not the same ones (see Table 9 .2). This explains the fact that there is only one issue-economic liberalism-that is highly politicised when compared to other electoral campaigns. The politicisation of this issue is mainly driven by polarised statements. In fact, economic liberalism received less than 10 % of the overall attention, while welfare and cultural liberalism received considerably more attention with, respectively, Table 9 .2 Conflicts over specific issues: crisis elections and change with respect to pre-crisis period Note: Salience refers to the number of core sentences on a given issue category as a share of all core sentences (0-1); polarisation indicates the degree to which the actors advocate different positions towards the specific issue (range 0-1).
In addition, we report salience multiplied by polarisation (multiplied by 100). As a benchmark, we have calculated the mean plus one standard deviation for all measures based on the data for a set of twelve issues and all elections from 1988 to 2008 (N = 156; 12 issues multiplied by 13 elections). All values above these benchmarks are highlighted in bold.
In other words, all values highlighted in bold indicate that an issue was either highly salient and/or polarised or we observe exceptional change Lastly, unlike what we observed in the French case, immigration is both a low salience and only a moderately polarised issue in the German context. Thus, neither of the two issues associated with the new integrationdemarcation cleavage had a structuring capacity.
The rather depoliticised German campaign was partly due to the fact that the opponent, Peer Steinbrück-coming from the moderate wing of the SPD-had difficulties to sell the more left-wing agenda proposed by his party and to steer the campaign away from the liberal reforms he had defended back under the Schröder government and under the grand coalition in 2005 -2009 (Mader 2014 . For this reason, Steinbrück faced difficulties in differentiating the SPD from the CDU. Furthermore, the blurring of the opposition between the two parties was also due to the fairly consensual way of handling the euro crisis during the previous legislative period. Lastly, some central propositions of the SPD, such as the introduction of a minimum wage, were taken over by the CDU. This overall consensus in terms of campaign issues is reflected in the low degree of politicisation that we observe in this campaign. As Faas (2014: 241) states, the Christian Democrats' strategy to focus their message on Angela Merkel and to avoid conflict made it hard for the other parties to run their campaign and successfully challenge the chancellor's party. In addition, the liberals were hardly visible with their substantive claims, and-according to our data-the AfD did not yet have a major impact on the campaign, among other things, because the established parties opted for a dismissive strategy, that is, they chose to ignore the new party and its key issues (see Meguid 2005) .
In Austria, the campaign centred on the economy and the welfare state, with a third issue, corruption scandals (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014) . The government parties put the emphasis on the former two and the relatively good economic performance of Austria compared to other European countries, while the opposition focused on the corruption scandals. As highlighted in Fig. 9 .1, welfare, economic liberalism, cultural liberalism, and immigration stand out in the 2013 campaign. The respective politicisation scores are driven by a very high salience-this is the case for welfare and economic liberalism-or by a very high degree of polarisatwo economic issues, the Austrian polarisation measures are fairly high. This is mainly due to the SPÖ proposals in favour of more distributive justice, including a proposal to introduce a wealth tax. In contrast to Germany, the left faced strong opposition from all its competitors on the right. The ÖVP opposed these proposed measures vehemently, and the BZÖ, in an attempt to distance itself more from the FPÖ, stressed economically liberal positions. The FPÖ still focused very much on its anti-immigration stance.
On all three new cultural issues, the Austrian parties adopted conflictive positions (see Table 9 .2 and immigration, Europe received only 2 % of the overall attention during the campaign. This may reflect the fact that no major decisions were taken at the European level at the moment of the campaign (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014: 648) , but it may also reflect Austria's less important role in the decision-making process more generally.
As indicated by these short descriptions, the issue-specific levels of salience and/or polarisation differ across the three countries and the crisis did not trigger a uniform reaction. Nonetheless, it might be that the crisis has led to major and systematic changes in case of some specific issues. To assess the pattern of change, the lower part of Table 9 .2 shows the changes from the pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) to 2012-2013. Again, changes that are above our benchmark are highlighted in bold.
Overall, we do not observe many instances of more than usual change. What has become far more politicised in France during the election in times of crisis is cultural liberalism. Although this issue was already high on the agenda of the previous presidential campaign during which Ségolène Royal led the socialist campaign (Tiberj 2013). Furthermore, we observe that the debate over Europe has become less polarised in 2012 and that the decline is rather sharp (−0.39). In Germany, there are no major changes for any of the issues in terms of the politicisation measure. Major changes in salience and polarisation can be observed for budget. rigor became at the same time less salient and more polarised than in the 2000s. Moreover, in the 2013 campaign, cultural liberalism gained more salience in the debate but this was again linked with decreasing differences in corresponding party positions. Lastly, it is again Austria where we observe the most pronounced change compared to the pre-crisis period. In Austria, three of the four highly politicised issues have witnessed a radical change as compared to the 2000s: welfare, economic liberalism, and cultural liberalism. Additionally, Europe has become more polarised than in earlier elections but, as previously noted, with a very low salience.
Positions Adopted on These Issues
In this third step of our analysis, we discuss changes in the overall party positions on these issues. The issues discussed and the degree of conflict in a given electoral campaign may remain similar to what was observed during previous electoral campaigns. Yet, what may change is the average position on these issues, that is, the centre of gravity of the political system on given issues. Indeed, it is interesting to see whether the crisis results in issue-specific moves to the right or the left. Some observers suggested that, in the short run, parties from the right will gain votes and attract more voters, but that, in the longer run, we may expect to find a stronger move towards the left (Lindvall 2014) . As indicated in the methods' section, the average position on a given issue may take values between −1 to +1. To assess whether the centre of gravity moved to the left or the right, we calculated the positions so that for the economic issues −1 corresponds to a right-wing position, that is to a position in favour of less state and more market (for instance more economic liberalism), while +1 stands for left-wing positions on the same issue, that is, a position in favour of more economic regulation. For the new cultural issues −1 identifies a position in favour of demarcation (for instance less supportive of European integration or immigration) and +1 identifies a more integrationist approach (in favour of European integration and immigration). Figure 9 .2 presents the shifts in the average positions on the key issue categories for the three countries. In line with our previous findings, we do not observe consistent shifts of the three political systems towards the right or the left. Most generally, we observe that the average position was more stable with respect to economic than new cultural issues. On the economic issues, be it welfare, economic liberalism, or budget, there is no change whatsoever in France. In Germany the average position on these issues shifted somewhat to the left, while in Austria, on welfare and economic liberalism, it shifted to the right. The difference between Austria and Germany mirrors our previous discussion on the different strategies of the political right when countering the Social Democrats' economic proposals. By contrast, the centre of gravity on some cultural issues has changed far more. Most importantly, on the issue of Europe, the average position has become more critical of Europe in each one of the three electoral campaigns in times of crisis as compared to the period 2000-2008. On the other cultural issues, the positions moved in different directions depending on both the country and the issue. Cultural liberalism was reinforced in both France and Austria, whereas we see hardly any change in Germany. Yet, on immigration, changes in position follow opposite trends-in Germany the average position has become more favourable to immigration, whereas in France and Austria positions against immigration were reinforced.
At the level of the party system, we cannot observe a consistent left or right turn in times of crisis. The only consistent shift involves the issue of European integration as the centre of gravity shifted to a more Eurocritical position in all three countries.
Issues and Parties: The Structure of the Political Spaces
In this last step, we turn to an analysis of the political spaces in these three countries. Using MDS for spatial visualization of both issues and parties, we compare the political spaces before (early 2000s) and in the crisis in each one of the three countries (Fig. 9.3 ). As can be seen, each of the three pairs of spaces is structured by two dimensions. The graphs have been drawn in such a way that the horizontal dimension corresponds to see again Table 9 .1). In each graph, the positions of the major parties have been linked to each other so that the dominant configuration in the party system becomes apparent. The larger the triangle (or the polygon) formed by this configuration, the greater the overall degree of polarisation between the major parties in a given system. The overall position of the triangle indicates the centre of gravity of the political structure, while its overall orientation-whether it is more aligned with the vertical or the horizontal dimension-indicates the relative importance of the cultural and the economic dimension for the structuration of the system. Starting with France, we see that the two dimensions of the political space are less integrated in the latest elections than previously, which means that the economic and the cultural dimension are more independently structuring the political space than in the two electoral campaigns of the early 2000s. Furthermore, as we have seen before, with respect to the degree of polarisation, there is more conflict on the cultural dimension. Although the FN moved to the left on the economic dimension, it remains close to the anti-immigration issue. Overall the centre of gravity of the French political space shifted toward welfare and cultural liberalism. Although no political party was close to economic liberalism in the first place, even the parties from the right moved away from it. The FN stands not only close to anti-immigration, but it has also moved rather far away from economic liberalism, although it is not close to welfare either. This highlights that the FN adopted a more left-wing economic program (see Lefkofridi and Michel 2014) but that it is still mainly associated with its tough stance on immigration in the public debate. Lastly, it is important to note that Europe moved to the outskirts of the space, which reflects the fact that all parties have adopted a more critical position and that it is no longer as clearly structuring the second, cultural dimension of the space in the 2012 election. In Germany, too, the space remains two-dimensional, with a slight increase in the independence of the two axes. This bi-dimensionality appears although the CDU moved up, slightly closer to welfare and cultural liberalism and further away from economic liberalism. The left parties are located close to one another. The SPD has moved closer to the Green and die Linke in the latest electoral campaign. Overall, the changes are less striking in Germany as the structure remained roughly the same. Nonetheless, we see that here parties moved away not only from economic liberalism but also from anti-immigration. All parties, with the exception of the FDP, who failed in this campaign, and of the newcomer of the AfD, fall in or close to the upper left-hand quadrant-favouring welfare and cultural liberalism. Indeed, there is no radical right party AfD with its anti-European and anti-immigration statements occupies a position in the political space where no other party stands, the bottom right-hand quadrant. Yet, as stated before, the AfD had a limited visibility in the media and, thus, it has hardly contributed to the structuring of the political space. Finally, we see again that Europe is not as integrated in the political space as it used to be. It is located at the margin and all parties stand apart from it, which again reflects the fact that Europe has not been a structuring issue at all in these elections-in spite of the euro crisis.
In contrast to the two previous cases, the Austrian political space appears more integrated in the latest electoral campaign as is shown by the fact that, in 2013, the economic and the cultural dimensions are less independent from each other. Nonetheless, the political space remains two-dimensional like in the other two countries. Importantly and as we have already noted repeatedly, we observe more competition on the economic dimension and more polarisation overall, as is indicated by the much larger triangle connecting the three major parties. In addition, each one of the main competitors is situated closely to its core issuesthe SPÖ is close to welfare, the ÖVP close to economic liberalism and further away from welfare, while the FPÖ is close to anti-immigration. prevent the formation of yet another grand coalition in Austria. In this case, Europe is not even in the picture. Due to the few references to this issue in the campaign, Europe does not reach the threshold set to include an issue in the political space as we have only included issues with more than 3 % of the statements.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we analysed potential transformations of the structure of party competition in France, Germany, and Austria. We inquired whether the euro crisis critically transformed political conflict at the party systemic level. More specifically, we were interested in exploring whether electoral campaigns shifted their focus in terms of either attention (measured through salience) or conflict (measured through polarisation) on economic issues or on new cultural issues, and whether recent campaigns saw major restructuration of the political space. What can we conclude based on our analyses? Most importantly, we saw that, at the systemic level, there have hardly occurred any exceptional changes which would warrant speaking of a paradigm shift in the structure of party competition (see also Bermeo and Bartels 2014) . Rather, the crisis seems to have reinforced trends already observed before its onset, namely, the emergence and growing importance of a second, cultural, dimension of the political conflict, driven by parties of the populist radical right.
First, we find that the economy has not become the only game in town. Two dimensions (an economic and a transformed cultural one) structure the political spaces in all three countries in 2012/2013 and we observe tri-polar party configurations as we did in the pre-crisis period (Kriesi et al. 2006 (Kriesi et al. , 2008 (Kriesi et al. , 2012 . In all three countries, welfare and to some extent economic liberalism are salient issues, but not more than in the campaigns during the early 2000s. Especially in France, the country confronted with the most negative economic prospects, the crisis did not trigger any major re-politicisation of economic issues. By contrast, we rather see the continuation of the long-term trend of their declining importance.
Second, although, political parties appear to be more polarised on the new cultural issues, the crisis did not uniformly boost their salience. Interestingly, the more salient conflicts over these issues become, the less polarised they get. It appears that the cultural dimension is reinforced as a structuring line of conflict because it gains prominence, not conflictive power. A uniform trend concerns European integration. The issue of European integration is no longer as firmly embedded in the cultural dimension, and it is not structuring the overall political space as most parties have converged on a more Euro-critical position in times of crisis as compared to the early 2000s. The average position on European integration became more Euro-critical to about the same extent in all three countries.
Third, we find that national trends remain important. The German campaign in 2013 can be labelled as rather depoliticised and we observe no major changes from the pre-crisis period. Interestingly, in Germany, the most salient issues are not polarised and the polarising issues gain limited attention. This reflects the Christian Democrats' strategy to focus their message on Angela Merkel and to move further to the left (by picking up issues emerging from the left and integrating them into her own program). This might have increased the niche in the political space occupied by the new challenger party AfD, which, however, did not (yet) have much influence on the overall structure of party competition at the period of the 2013 campaign. In France, the campaign further shifted to new cultural issues (Tiberj 2013). On the economic dimension, we observe limited change, although even the Front National adopted a more left-wing agenda. As a result, all parties are located further to the left in the political space and far more spread along the cultural dimension. Finally, in Austria, the picture is different as we observe increasingly salient and polarised conflicts over both dimensions. Unexpectedly, the economic dimension is even more salient. Indeed, in Austria, we find a strong increase in conflicts over economic liberalism, while Europe almost disappeared from the campaign. But it is important to again highlight that, even in Austria, this did not lead to any major restructuring of the political space.
As stated in the introduction, we submitted the idea of a paradigm shift to a hard empirical test as we did not include any of the countries which observed this restructuring of the political spaces in France, Austria, or Germany, we would be confident that the crisis has had a strong impact on party politics across Europe. As the Greek example shows, the crisis may be an earthquake that shakes the foundations of the political system and greatly contributes to the emergence of new political parties and new lines of conflict in the political space. In future research, we propose to expand this research to Southern European countries not only to study the rise of Syriza in Greece as a unique case of transformation of the political space but also to confront it with other similar phenomena in Spain or Italy, as well as divergent trajectories in Portugal. Indeed, the debtor countries from Southern Europe did not seem to uniformly witness the emergence of new challengers in the political arena. In Italy and Spain, the Movimento Cinque Stelle and Podemos challenge the established political parties, while in Portugal no comparable challenger has emerged yet. This will allow us to inquire whether the crisis in its medium-term evolution led to a restructuring of political spaces in the countries confronted with drastic austerity and widespread dissatisfaction with political elites and their management of the crisis.
To put these results into a broader perspective, let us again emphasise that the upshot of the cumulated effect of the Great Recession on the party systems in Europe do not indicate a shift in paradigm but rather the reinforcement of long-term destabilizing trends that have been transforming the party systems in the Northwest of Europe for more than 20 years before the crisis set in. And these trends seem to have belatedly and Kriesi (2015) show, the main electoral beneficiaries of the economic hardship in Western have been new parties, as well as parties of the radical populist right and the radical left. By contrast, the impact of the Great Recession on the party systems of Central and Eastern European countries has been quite different. In these countries, incumbents have been punished less for economic hardship than for increasing corruption, and the party systems have followed an opposite trend as they have stabilized to some extent. While the volatility of the Central and Eastern European party systems is still a lot higher than in Western Europe, it is noteworthy that the volatility between established parties has actually decreased in these countries in the crisis period.
sis on the structuration of political conflict within and across European regions. In the light of the already apparent diverging trajectories found transformations in specific countries or regions, but it may not lead to a 'new era of democratic politics' as hypothesised in the introduction of this book. Taking a long-term view, we might rather observe a convergence of party systems in Europe. Lane and Ersson (1996: 130) already suggested some time ago that, in terms of volatility, fractionalization, and polarisation, the party systems of Eastern and Western Europe might have more in common than things that set them apart. While considering it still premature to speak of convergence of the party systems in the two parts of Europe, the contrasting experience of Western and Central and Eastern European party systems during the Great Recession suggest that the long-term trends may bring them closer together.
